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ABSTRACT
Creating a state-of-the-art deep-learning system requires vast amounts
of data, expertise, and hardware, yet research into embedding copy-
right protection for neural networks has been limited. One of the
main methods for achieving such protection involves relying on the
susceptibility of neural networks to backdoor attacks, but the robust-
ness of these tactics has been primarily evaluated against pruning,
fine-tuning, and model inversion attacks. In this work, we propose a
neural network “laundering” algorithm to remove black-box back-
door watermarks from neural networks even when the adversary has
no prior knowledge of the structure of the watermark.
We are able to effectively remove watermarks used for recent
defense or copyright protection mechanisms while achieving test
accuracies above 97% and 80% for both MNIST and CIFAR-10,
respectively. For all backdoor watermarking methods addressed in
this paper, we find that the robustness of the watermark is signif-
icantly weaker than the original claims. We also demonstrate the
feasibility of our algorithm in more complex tasks as well as in more
realistic scenarios where the adversary is able to carry out efficient
laundering attacks using less than 1% of the original training set size,
demonstrating that existing backdoor watermarks are not sufficient
to reach their claims.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have become the state-of-the-art stan-
dard across a wide variety of fields ranging from computer vision
to speech recognition systems, and they have been predominantly
adopted by many industries [1]. As a result, many organizations
have come to heavily rely on neural networks as part of their core
operations, which requires a substantial investment into very pow-
erful computing resources, vast quantities of data, and specialized
machine learning expertise. Hence, organizations that do build and
train their own models would need to protect their systems from
plagiarism, and those who sell or share their models would also want
to demonstrate ownership of the system when an infringement of
copyright occurs.
Thus far, attempts to develop provable ownership in neural net-
works have mainly relied on two distinct categories of watermarking
techniques: (1) Watermarks that are embedded through backdoor-
ing attacks by injecting the backdoor via training images [2, 3],
and (2) Watermarks created and embedded directly into the neural
network [4, 5]. Our work focuses on the first set of watermarking
techniques which we refer to as “Backdoor Watermarks.” In these
types of watermarks, the technique typically involves embedding
specially-crafted inputs into the training of a neural network that
is designed to have a highly consistent, but unusual, output during
Table 1: Comparison of neural network backdooring and wa-
termarking techniques.
Offensive (backdoor) Defensive (watermark)
Bit
embedding
N/A
Uchida et al. [4],
DeepSigns [5], etc.
Mitigated by:
N/A
Mitigated by:
N/A
Backdoor
embedding
BadNets [6],
Liu et al. [7], etc.
Adi et al. [3],
Zhang et al. [2], etc.
Mitigated by:
Fine-Pruning [8],
Neural Cleanse [9]
Mitigated by:
Our work
testing. For example, a watermark may be embedded into a network
by including a subset of images during initial training that can skew
the network to classify those images unexpectedly. This subset may
involve a “trigger set” of unrelated images [3], or it may contain
content or noise overlaid on the image [2]. In all of these cases,
feeding the specially-crafted inputs into the trained system returns a
consistent output that would not be expected normally. Because of
the often overwhelming state of backdoors versus watermarks, we
have provided a comparison of related work in Table 1 to highlight
where our work falls within this domain.
The owner organization can then use the network’s output to
demonstrate their ownership of the model because only their wa-
termarked model would behave specifically in this way. That is,
black-box watermarks attempt to prove ownership of a model us-
ing only public API access by querying the potentially plagiarized
network with carefully constructed inputs.
In particular, Zhang et al. [2] proposed a watermarking model
to be secure against model-pruning, fine-pruning, and inversion at-
tacks. Adi et al. [3] also proposed a watermarking model to be robust
against similar removal attacks. These approaches [2, 3] allow for
the embedding and detection of watermarks that are human-readable
(content-based watermarks) as well as those that are not human-
readable (unrelated or noise-based watermarks) in black-box scenar-
ios. Moreover, Zhang et al.’s model [2] appears to be considered for
deployment at large IT companies that deploy deep neural network
services, such as IBM1. However, it is still questionable whether
currently suggested state-of-the-art watermarking techniques are
really robust against sophisticated and targeted manipulation of the
structure of the neural network, especially given recent research
demonstrating significant success at removing backdoors from neu-
ral networks altogether [8, 9]. Backdoors and watermarks both may
1https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2018/07/ai-watermarking/
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Figure 1: Examples of watermarked images used in the MNIST
(top) and CIFAR-10 (bottom) datasets following the description
in previous work [2]. MNIST examples are watermarked to be
classified as “0”, and CIFAR-10 examples as “airplane”.
exploit the overparameterization of neural networks to learn multi-
ple tasks, but while a backdoor is generally used by adversaries for
malicious ends (e.g., misclassifying stop signs with stickers as speed
limit signs [6]), watermarks are used against adversaries to prevent
their deployment of stolen models.
In this work, we present our novel neural network “laundering”
algorithm to effectively remove potentially watermarked neurons or
channels in DNN layers. We achieve this via a three-step process
of watermark recovery, detecting and resetting watermarked neu-
rons, and retraining on the reconstructed watermarks and watermark
masks, each step taking advantage of novel contributions. Moreover,
our approach considers various types of backdoor attacks in black-
box models as well, and we present the application of our proposed
“laundering” technique to defeat backdoor attacks [7, 10].
To show the effectiveness of our laundering algorithm, we com-
pare it with the removal attempts made within these original wa-
termark proposal papers [2, 3]. We also compare our results to the
“Fine-Pruning” [8] backdoor removal technique; detailed backdoor
background information and evaluation are available in Appendix A.
The structures of all our models can also be found in Appendix B.
Our approach shows weaknesses of current deep neural network
watermarking techniques – we can defeat the state-of-the-art water-
marking techniques proposed by Zhang et al. [2] and Adi et al. [3].
In particular, we show that with an appropriate representation of the
variety of training data, adversaries who have no knowledge of the
watermark are able to successfully remove the majority of water-
marking techniques, retaining accuracy much higher than stated in
the prior work, (e.g., up to 20% higher in some cases [2]).
In addition, previous studies (e.g., [11, 12]) presenting defense
mechanisms for adversarial attacks often argued that some attacks
require significant computation. However, as in other DNN attacking
research [13], we show that this assumption would not be sufficient
to provide adequate defense. Instead, if thieves even have the suspi-
cion that a watermarked model could potentially be laundered, they
may invest significant effort to remove the watermark. Laundering a
stolen model may save significant time and money in data collection,
data labeling, and neural network design and construction.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We present our novel neural network “laundering” algo-
rithm, which effectively removes neurons or channels in
DNN layers that contribute to the classification of water-
marked images. Differentiating us from previous work
which focused on adversarial backdoors [9], we take on the
viewpoint of the attacker attempting to remove watermarks
(i.e., defensive backdoors) and evaluate our effectiveness
under various limited training sets to which an attacker may
have access.
• We provide an intensive overview of the combination of pa-
rameters used for laundering a neural network for different
types of layers and network architectures. We also evaluate
the effectiveness of different combinations of parameters
and available data both regarding the removal of water-
marks [2] and backdoors [7, 10] as well as the preservation
of model performance.
• We discuss in-depth the findings from our experiments
and highlight the previously-overlooked weaknesses that
currently exist within most watermarking schemes. We
also provide new insights into the reasons adversaries will
attack a watermarked model despite accuracy loss as well
as the reasons previous backdoor-removal techniques do
not exploit the weaknesses in watermarks specifically.
2 BACKGROUND
Backdooring attacks on neural networks have highlighted serious
weaknesses in the black-box nature of neural networks throughout a
variety of different tasks and model structures [6, 7, 10]. Backdoors
exploit the vulnerability of the overparameterization of deep neural
networks to hide deliberately-designed backdoors in the model.
If the training of a network is outsourced to a third party that sur-
reptitiously inserts specific and maliciously-labeled training images,
the victim organization will receive a model that behaves correctly
on the surface but contains a hidden backdoor. For example, the
BadNets research [6] demonstrated that it was possible to force the
misclassification of stop signs to more than 90% using only a yellow
Post-it note sized square overlaid on the images.
2.1 Backdoor Watermarking Techniques
Some research has proposed utilizing the weaknesses of neural net-
works to backdoor attacks as a method for embedding watermarks.
One specific implementation of this watermarking process is Zhang
et al.’s [2] black-box technique that uses watermarked images as
part of the training set of the network, consistently labeled as one
class. These watermarked images include the following three types
of images as shown in Figure 1: 1) meaningful content (e.g., a word)
placed over part of the image in some subset of training images (“con-
tent”), 2) pre-specified (Gaussian) noise over some subset of training
images (“noise”), or 3) completely unrelated images (“unrelated”).
Note that Figure 1 (f) is an image taken from MNIST but used as
an “unrelated” watermark in CIFAR-10. In their experiments, they
demonstrate minimal impact on the accuracy of the model, and their
watermarks remain strong even after substantial pruning, tuning, and
model inversion attacks [14] against the watermarked model.
Adi et al. [3] similarly proposed using the mechanics of back-
doors to embed watermarks to prove non-trivial ownership of neural
network models. In their approach, the authors utilized 100 abstract
images, each randomly assigned to a target class for their trigger
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set. Furthermore, their embedding procedure required the owner to
sample k images from the trigger set during each training batch.
Note that unlike watermarking, backdoors typically do not rely
heavily on the “unrelated” style of image from [2] or the abstract
images from [3]. Overlaying part of the image (e.g., with glasses
or noise) is common in backdoors, but unrelated images such as
those used in watermarking schemes such as [3] are not commonly
addressed in backdoor removal papers because such images would be
predicted randomly. Nonetheless, our work focuses on highlighting
the shortcomings of all varieties such watermarking techniques:
“content”, “noise”, and “unrelated.”
2.2 General Backdoor Removal Techniques
Other research has tackled a similar problem of removing backdoors
in neural networks, and one highly related research is the work by
Liu et al. [8]. This work proposed a two-step process to remove
backdoors by first pruning the network followed by fine-tuning the
pruned network. Their method shows success in removing backdoors
from different deep neural network implementations. Similarly, re-
cent research by Wang et al. [9] has shown the ability to recover
sufficiently similar backdoor triggers embedded in maliciously back-
doored neural networks. Their research focuses on the ability of
victims to detect and remove backdoors from their networks, where
the victims have access to their full training set but would like to
avoid intensive retraining on the model. Research [9] has also in-
vestigated backdoor removal techniques, where the victim has no
knowledge of a backdoor trigger but aims to take efforts to poten-
tially remove it. Because of the similarity in goals, we leverage
Wang et al.’s backdoor reconstruction algorithm [9], which begins
with discovering a trigger with the following formulation:
A(x ,m,∆) = x ′
x ′i,j,c = (1 −mi,j) · xi,j,c + mi,j · ∆i,j,c, (1)
where A(·) is the trigger application function, x is the original
image, ∆ is the trigger image, and m is the mask for the trigger. They
further constrict this algorithm by measuring the magnitude of the
trigger by the L1 norm of m to result in the final formulation of:
min
m,∆
`(yt , f (A(x ,m,∆))) + λ · |m |
for x ∈ X, (2)
where f (·) is the networks output prediction function, `(·) is the
loss function, λ controls the magnitude for controlling the size of the
reversed trigger, and X represents the available non-watermarked
images. For more detailed information regarding the construction
scheme, we direct the reader to the original paper [9] or to their
open-source implementation2.
3 ATTACK MODEL
In our attack model, we define two parties: the true owner O of the
neural network model m and the plagiarizer P who has managed to
procure m. P may have acquired m through a variety of ways, not all
of which may be malicious; however, the exact means by which P
acquires m is outside the scope of this paper. The model m performs
a particular task t, but is watermarked in such a way that certain,
carefully-constructed examples Xw will give highly specific output
2https://github.com/bolunwang/backdoor
at the task t. In our attack model, the goal of the plagiarizer P is to
alter m in such a way that the examples Xw will no longer result in
predictable outputs from m while minimally impacting t.
Our attack model places certain limitations on plagiarizer P. First,
P has a substantially limited set of training data when compared
to the creator O. Otherwise, P could trivially label a large set of
non-watermarked training data using m to create a non-watermarked
model by predictive model theft techniques [15]. Second, P does not
know if m has been watermarked but assumes it to be. Therefore, our
proposed attack method should be able to overcome the robustness
of the watermarked model m to pruning and fine-tuning with limited
training data such that m can adequately perform task t without
reacting to watermarked examples.
As described in other work [2, 4, 5], watermarks in neural net-
works are designed to be robust to pruning, fine-tuning, and/or water-
mark overwriting as well as secure against discovery of the presence
of a watermark in the model. Although there exist watermarking
techniques that are robust to both traditional pruning and retraining,
we present more sophisticated methods that are able to greatly hin-
der and defeat the effectiveness of these black-box watermarking
embedding algorithms.
4 PROPOSED LAUNDERING TECHNIQUE
In this section, we describe our algorithms in more detail for re-
moving watermarks from neural networks. Adversaries, which were
described as the plagiarizer P in the previous Attack Model section,
have access to the intermediate pre-trained layers of the watermarked
neural network (Lj ), which, in this case, have been watermarked
during the original training process. Additionally, the adversaries
have their own training dataset that has been labelled correctly (Xi ).
Adversaries have procured this correctly-labelled dataset either man-
ually or perhaps by using the watermarked network’s outputs to
automatically label the examples [15]. It is important to note that the
output of the watermarked neural network would not intentionally
misclassify any of these images during creation of the correctly-
labelled dataset if the adversary chooses that method; none of these
images would contain such a specific watermark by pure chance.
While throughout this section we draw upon previous backdoor-
reconstruction techniques [9], we include our own novel contribu-
tions, specifically designed to help function in black-box watermark-
removal scenarios. These include:
• Combining the “pruning” and “unlearning” steps proposed
in [9] as a two-step approach to removing watermarks even
with very limited retraining data.
• Implementing a statistical-based approach used to decide if
neurons should be reset within a layer based on the relative
average activation of the entire dense or convolutional layer.
• Extensively investigating “unrelated” and “noise” style of
watermarks which tend to avoid detection and removal in
the backdoor removal schemes [8, 9].
• Offering an additional application of the reverse-engineered
masks generated during the watermark reverse-engineering
process to aid in the removal of the unrelated style of wa-
termark.
A black-box attack watermark removal technique requires more
effort than a white-box adversary scenario. The recent “Neural
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Figure 2: Overview of black-box laundering procedure, where the vanilla images are normally labeled data and red crosses are the
reset neurons. This shows the process of recovering potential watermarks using methods such as Wang et al.’s [9], laundering the
network via our algorithm, and finally retraining the network based on re-labeled reconstructed images. The process is repeated over
multiple iterations where the retrained model is fed back into the reconstruction algorithm.
Cleanse” [9] research poses a significant step toward the reduction
of the threat that backdoors pose to neural networks. At the same
time, however, it highlights the weaknesses of the security of neural
network watermarks, which requires that a network shall not reveal
any information regarding the watermarks’ presence in the network.
While this method showed success in many backdoor scenarios
where the victim was able to reconstruct a highly representative
example of the actual backdoor, our results demonstrated a need
to incorporate their proposed reconstructive process into a larger
algorithm attack from the adversary’s standpoint.
In order to perform such an attack, we propose the following
3-step process: 1) watermark recovery, 2) black-box attack launder-
ing via the algorithm proposed in Algorithm 1, and 3) black-box
adversary retraining. Step 2 is required to reset potentially water-
marked neurons, and Step 3 restores the performance of the fully
laundered model back to acceptable levels in instances, where Step 2
has reset a large number of neurons that also serve an important role
in final non-watermarked classification. We present the end-to-end
black-box laundering procedure in Figure 2. We will now go more
in-depth on each of these steps.
Step 1. Watermark Recovery. As discussed in Section 2, there
exist methods to discover potential backdoors within neural net-
works [9]. Using such a method, it is possible to reconstruct the
smallest perturbations required to push one class to another. How-
ever, this step alone is insufficient in the watermark removal domain.
Step 2. Black-box Attack Laundering. While black-box ad-
versaries have no access to known watermark images, they assume
the reconstructed watermarks to be accurate representations of the
actual watermarked images. As such, the reconstructed watermarks
are overlain on the adversary’s available training data, and these sets
are sent through the laundering algorithm.
Using these manually-constructed watermarks, the adversary is
able to observe and record the activations of each layer Lj for each
watermarked image in Wk of the neural network to calculate the
total watermarked activation for each neuron AW totalj . Then, the
adversary simply calculates the average activation of each neuron
individually AW avдj by dividing by the number of training examples
as shown in line 8 of Algorithm 1.
Following this, the adversary may perform a similar calculation
across all non-watermarked imagesXi through all the neural network
layers Lj and observe and record these observations for the total
non-watermarked activation for each neuron AN totalj . The adver-
sary then calculates the average of each neuron to calculate AN avдj .
As a result, the adversary now has the ability to subtract the average
normal image activation AN avдj from the average watermarked acti-
vation AW avдj . This results in the average difference in activation
of that layer Adif fj demonstrated in line 10 of Algorithm 1.
From here, the adversary simply resets any neuron that activated
strongly when in the presence of watermarked images but did not ac-
tivate strongly for non-watermarked images. The adversary does this
by stepping through each neuronv in Lj and removing it if the differ-
ence in the activation between watermarked and non-watermarked
images (Adif fjv ) falls above some threshold value DT as in line 14
of Algorithm 1. If the layer is convolutional (and the activation
difference falls above CT ), then the adversary would instead reset
the entire intermediate channel AN avдjv .
“Resetting” a neuron or channel may take many forms. In our
case, we immediately reset the weights of the input into the layer
to zero during the algorithm, maintaining those reset weights on
each successive pass through all layers Lj in order to retrain the
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Algorithm 1 Watermark Laundering algorithm (Step 2)
1: Given:
Trained intermediate layers (Lj ) for j = 0, 1, · · · J
Normally labeled data (Xi ) for i = 0, 1, · · · , I
(Recovered) Watermarked data (Xk ) for k = 0, 1, · · · ,k
2: Predefined:
Dense layer activation threshold (DT )
Convolutional layer activation threshold (CT )
3: for j = 0, 1, · · · , J do
4: for i = 0, 1, · · · , I do
5: AN totalj += Lj (Xi )
6: for k = 0, 1, · · · ,K do
7: AW totalj += Lj (Wk )
8: Avg layer watermark activation AW avдj = AW
total
j /K
9: Avg layer normal activation AN avдj = AN
total
j /I
10: Activation difference Adif fj = AW
avд
j −AN
avд
j
11: for j = 0, 1, · · · , J do
12: if Lj TYPE is DENSE then
13: for v = 0, 1, · · · ,V do
14: if AN avдjv > DT then
15: Reset intermediate layer neuron Ljv
16: else if Lj TYPE is CONV then
17: for v = 0, 1, · · · ,V do
18: if AN avдjv > CT then
19: Reset intermediate layer channel AN avдjv
network, while preventing the watermarked neurons from reappear-
ing. For most activation functions, setting the weights to zero would
achieve the desired effect; however, this may not always be the case.
Neurons that leverage activation functions such as softplus [16] that
produce non-zero output at point 0 may still be highly activated in
the presence of zero-weighted inputs. In such a case, it would be
up to the adversary to choose a more appropriate resetting proce-
dure, although we propose simply setting those neurons’ or channels’
weights to the layer’s median weight may suffice as well.
Step 3. Black-box Adversary Retraining. Finally, the model is
retrained on all available examples, including those collected during
reconstruction. Note that these non-watermarked examples were
the same examples passed through the neural network in the laun-
dering step, except in this step, watermarked examples are labeled
as the correct class. This is similar to retraining steps in backdoor-
removal methods [8, 9]; however, unlike backdoor scenarios, we
also face the “unrelated” watermark which has no “correct” label.
Also unlike Neural Cleanse [9], we use the Median Absolute Devi-
ation technique to identify the class least likely to be watermarked
and label our reconstructed unrelated images to that class during
retraining. For this reason, we stop laundering early if the original
most-likely-infected class is considered to be the least likely to be
infected. Otherwise, retraining could be strengthening the origi-
nal watermark. Additionally, we also feed the reconstructed masks
themselves generated during the reverse-engineering step into the
retraining dataset. These are also labeled as the least likely class,
which acts as a secondary approach to remove neurons potentially
watermarked with the unrelated style of image. The retrained model
is then fed back into the backdoor reconstruction algorithm.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we recreated
the results of Zhang et al.’s work [2] for both MNIST and CIFAR-10.
In general, the architectures of the deep neural networks followed
the procedure according to the original papers [2, 3], but we will
elaborate on any differences where relevant. We followed Zhang
et al.’s implementation as described in their paper [2] for MNIST
and CIFAR-10; however, while following the description given
for the CIFAR-10 model, our models consistently converged at
approximately 73% test accuracy, rather than the 78% given in the
original work.
For re-implementing Adi et al.’s watermarking scheme, we fol-
lowed both the pre-trained (PT) procedure where watermarks are
embedded into the network following non-watermarked training
as well as the from-scratch (FS) procedure where watermarks are
embedded during training. Their original implementation converged
at 93.65% for CIFAR-10; however, our models converged at 91.15%
when implementing their method in Keras using ResNet18 [17].
Nevertheless, we were able to recreate the 100% watermark accura-
cies on this model described in the original work [3].
The results in this section correspond to one round of launder-
ing. We reset all layers in all DNNs except for those models using
ResNet18+ (which is used in Adi et al.’s scheme [3]). Due to the
depth of that model, we reset the second half of the weights only;
the weights of the first half appear to being learning very high-level
features that do not correspond directly with the watermarks.
We implemented our neural laundering prototype in Python 3.6
with Keras 2.1.6 and Tensorflow 1.7.0. The experiments were con-
ducted on a machine with an Intel i5 CPU, 16 GB RAM, and 3
Nvidia 1080 Ti GPUs with 11GB GDDR5X.
In order to evaluate our laundering technique in a realistic setting,
we limited the adversary’s retraining dataset size in the case of black-
box attackers. Especially for MNIST, using even half of the test set
size for training or retraining as performed in Zhang et al.’s original
work [2] is sufficient to train a model to above 90%, with or without
the watermarked model. As a result, if we do not limit the training
size, adversaries could simply train their own neural network from
the output of the watermarked model using prediction algorithms
found in Trame`r et al.’s work [15]. This situation inherently implies
there would be no need for laundering a watermarked network at all
given a large retraining set size.
As a result, for the results against Zhang et al.’s watermarking
scheme [2] we purposely limited the adversary’s MNIST retrain-
ing dataset to be 0.6% of the original training set size of 60,000
handwritten digits, which results in approximately 42 images per
category. Likewise, we also limited the CIFAR-10 dataset to 0.6%,
which results in approximately 36 images per category. In reality, it
is likely that adversaries would have more data available, and they
would achieve better results than the conservative results we report.
For the following evaluation sections, we will repeatedly refer to
Table 2, wherein we list our results - in rows following “Ours” in
column 1 (“Method”) - directly below the proposed watermarking
approach and other authors’ original watermark removal attempts
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Table 2: Results of the black-box adversary algorithm for various watermarks and backdoors.
Method Dataset Watermark
Type
Original Test
Accuracy
Laundered
Test
Accuracy
Original
Watermark
Accuracy
Laundered
Watermark
Accuracy
Vanilla Model
Watermark
Accuracy
Limited
Retraining
Size
Zhang et al.
MNIST
Content 99.46% 97.03% 100% 99.95% 1.5% 16.6%
(90% pruning) Noise 99.41% 95.19% 100% 99.55% 6.0% 16.6%
Unrelated 99.43% 93.55% 100% 99.9% 20% 16.6%
Ours
Content 99.90% 98.34% 100% 0.01% 1.5% 0.6%
Noise 99.86% 97.45% 99.99% 0.07% 6.0% 0.6%
Unrelated 99.92% 98.33% 99.71% 15% 20% 0.6%
Zhang et al.
CIFAR-10
Content 78.41% 64.9% 99.93% 99.47% 5.0% 20.0%
(90% pruning) Noise 78.49% 59.29% 100% 65.13% 4.0% 20.0%
Unrelated 78.12% 62.15% 99.86% 10.93% 52.0% 20.0%
Ours
Content 90.24% 87.65% 100% 1.4% 5.0% 0.6%
Noise 89.01% 84.14% 100% 0.50% 4.0% 0.6%
Unrelated 89.77% 85.34% 99.94% 16% 52.0% 0.6%
Adi et al. (PT)
CIFAR-10 Unrelated
93.65% ∼90% 100% 100% 7% ∼
Ours (PT) 91.55% 88.25% 100% 7.0% 12% 10.8%
Adi et al. (FS) 93.81% ∼90% 100% 80% 7% ∼
Ours (FS) 91.85% 84.73% 100% 7.0% 12% 10.8%
for comparison. Column 4 (“Original Test Accuracy”) and column
5 (“Laundered Test Accuracy”) record the accuracy on the never-
before-seen test set by the original watermarked network before
laundering and then subsequently on the laundered watermarked net-
work, respectively. Similarly, column 6 (“Original Watermark Accu-
racy”) and column 7 (“Laundered Watermark Accuracy”) record the
accuracy of the detected watermarks by the original watermarked
network before laundering and then subsequently on the laundered
watermarked network, respectively. The thresholds at which the
watermarks are unusable for ownership demonstration purposes are
listed in column 8 (“Vanilla Model Watermark Accuracy”), and we
discuss how we derive these values in Section 7.1. Finally, we pro-
vide a comparison of the size of the dataset used in the watermark
removal process in column 9 (“Limited Retraining Size”), which cor-
responds to the “normally labeled data” referenced in Algorithm 1.
MNIST and CIFAR-10 Results via Zhang et al.’s Method. For
the MNIST model across all watermarking types, our method was
able to remove detected watermarks below unusable levels. The
content and noise watermarks are significantly recovered and fall sig-
nificantly below even random classification, and although unrelated
watermarks are much higher (e.g., 15% for the MNIST unrelated
watermark), they fall below the vanilla model watermark accuracy
(e.g., 20% again for the MNIST unrelated watermark).
Again, our method was able to remove detected watermarks below
usable levels for all watermark types, while minimizing the drop in
test classification to about 5% overall. One point of importance is
that for CIFAR-10 unrelated watermarks, our model does not reduce
watermark accuracy as much as the reported pruning techniques used
in [2]. Nevertheless, our method does maintain a higher percentage
of the final test accuracy. The original paper recorded a drop from
78.12% accuracy to 62.15% (shown in columns 4 and 5 in Table 2)
while our method results in a drop from 89.77% accuracy to 85.34%.
Additionally, our method demonstrates its effectiveness when using
a smaller dataset size.
CIFAR-10 Results via Adi et al.’s Method. In Adi et al.’s pro-
posed watermarking scheme [3], they included 100 unrelated (ab-
stract) images, labeled each image with a random class, and trained
their model on these images as well. However, their method pro-
posed two ways to embed the watermark, either into the model from
scratch (FS) or by fine-tuning a pre-trained (PT) model. We include
evaluations of both approaches in Table 2.
While there are perhaps more efficient ways to attack the Adi
et al. [3] watermarking scheme, we do not adapt our method to
be specifically tailored to the Adi scheme. We aimed to test our
watermark removal strategy as an agnostic method with only one
minor modification. Empirically, for very deep networks such as
ResNet18+ [17], resetting many shallow layers significantly im-
pacted the overall final performance of the model. While one layer
is not enough, resetting all shallow layers results in deep layers
receiving activations that they were not originally trained to receive.
As a result, for the ResNet model, we chose to reset only the second
half of the weights. Additionally, the results in Table 2 include a
larger subset of available training data than used against Zhang et
al. [2]. A further discussion of this is explained in Section 6.
We find that in both cases (during training and post-training) the
watermarks are significantly less robust than the original claims
by Adi et al. [3] using our approach. We compared our results
to the original watermark removal technique referred to as “Re-
train All Layers (RTAL)”. Even in the original research, the RTAL
watermark removal technique had significantly reduced the accuracy
of the pre-trained watermark set. However, we also find that the FS
watermarks face similar problems, perhaps due to the reliance on
batch normalization [18]. Before retraining, we also reset the batch
normalization. Additionally, the authors do not use a limited dataset
to evaluate their watermark removal methods.
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Figure 3: Results of laundering the MNIST and MNIST+ models to remove Zhang et al.’s proposed watermarks [2].
6 EVALUATION OF REQUIRED DATA FOR
WATERMARK REMOVAL
In other backdoor or watermark research [2, 8] researchers have
typically given the remover a typical train-test split worth of data.
For example, in the original Zhang et al. [2] watermark proposal, the
adversary was given the entire test set of the default train-test split
from the MNIST dataset to attempt to remove the watermark via
pruning and retraining. Even though these techniques are typically
unable to remove watermarks, an adversary would actually have
no need to remove them. Using the neural network structure and
dataset split utilized in Zhang et al.’s paper [2], adversaries could
train their own MNIST models using the test set only and still easily
reach 90% or above accuracies, completely removing the need to
launder the watermarked model. However, because our approaches
are able to directly target weaknesses of watermarking techniques
and because we approach this issue from the point of an attacker, we
may consider the adversary to be even more limited than the other
watermark or backdoor removal research has considered.
Therefore, in the above Table 2 in Section 5, we included the
results where an adversary was limited to 0.6% (except in the case
of Adi et al. [3], shown in the final section of Table 2) of the total
training data as well as the results from only one round of laundering.
However, we also investigated the effectiveness of our approach
under a variety of other splits. These include 10.8%, 6%, and 0.6%,
and finally only one example per class as depicted in the various
lines in Figure 3 and 4. Additionally, because a black-box adversary
has no knowledge of the watermark detection accuracy, we also
evaluated scenarios, where an adversary performed multiple rounds
of laundering (up to 10).
In Figure 3 and 4, the blue lines represent the final test accuracy on
unseen data, and the red lines represent the accuracy on watermarked
images. Each line style is representative of an available dataset
size, and the solid black line represents what we propose to be the
minimum watermark accuracy required to claim ownership of a
model. We discuss the minimum watermark accuracy value more in
Section 7.1.
MNIST Results via Zhang et al.’s Method. Due to the sim-
plicity of the model, even a small number of laundering examples
- down to even one image per class in some cases - is enough to
make a significant impact on the watermark accuracy, especially
with a small number of iterations. We show that most combinations
perform similarly in Figure 3. For example, Figure 3 (a), (b), and
(c) all show a decline in watermark accuracy (via red lines) after
very few rounds. Additionally, the final testing accuracy (via blue
lines) also shows significant resilience even after multiple rounds of
laundering, declining gradually over time. However, perhaps due
to the complexity of the watermark in the content-based scenario
(as shown in Figure 3 (a), one example per class (solid blue and red
lines) is not enough to remove the watermark for plain MNIST.
Moreover, we also trained a more complex version of MNIST
with six additional classes taken from the EMNIST dataset [19]
(specifically letters ‘t’, ‘u’, ‘w’, ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’). Note that while these
images are from the EMNIST dataset, we refer to this model as
the MNIST+ model as it does not contain all EMNIST classes. As
shown in Figure 3 (d), (e), (f), the inclusion of additional classes
made two notable differences. First, in this model our algorithm
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Figure 4: Results of laundering the CIFAR-10 model to remove Adi et al.’s [3] and Zhang et al.’s [2] proposed watermarks.
was able to remove the content-based watermarks completely. This
strongly suggests that having a few more training examples is enough
to reconstruct content-based watermarks more effectively, although
future work will be required to understand this phenomenon in depth.
Second, because of the larger number of class sizes, the unrelated
watermarks were classified as the watermarked class less often in
the clean network, pushing the target black line lower.
As a result, the smaller dataset sizes (0.6% and one-per-class –
dashed triangles and solid lines, respectively) struggled to push the
watermark below that threshold. Our MNIST+ dataset also captures
more generalized results than plain MNIST in the testing accuracy
as well. As expected, one-per-class impacted testing accuracy the
most. Due to the simplicity of plain MNIST, this phenomenon was
not captured in those experiments.
CIFAR-10 Results via Adi et al.’s Method. Although the CIFAR-
10 task is significantly more complex than MNIST, the 10.8%, 6.0%,
and 0.6% retraining sets in Figure 4 (a) and (b) were able to remove
the watermarks, while maintaining a significantly high test accuracy.
However, as expected, the accuracy dropped over multiple rounds of
laundering, particularly as the size of the laundered set decreased.
We speculate that this is owed more to overfitting than to our laun-
dering method. In this case, however, the one-per-class laundering
set is completely inadequate, especially over time, in both cases.
Regardless of combination, the Adi et al.’s [3] from-scratch (FS)
technique outperforms the pre-trained (PT) technique. Nevertheless,
due to the complexity of the task as well as the resilience of the
watermark scheme, our scheme does incur a loss of test accuracy on
small laundering set sizes. We discuss the implications of this drop
in test accuracy in Section 7.4.
CIFAR-10 Results via Zhang et al.’s Method. Again due to the
complexity of the task required to classify CIFAR-10 images, we
expected a large impact on the test accuracy over time, and the results
do show this phenomenon in Figure 4 (c), (d), and (e). As in the Adi
et al. model, the one-per-class laundering set is again inadequate.
However, both the content and noise watermarks were removed via
our method in the 10.8%, 6.0%, and 0.6% cases, although with a
cost to final test accuracy that worsened across multiple iterations.
The unrelated watermarks were much more difficult to consistently
remove, with seemingly random high fluctuations. However, the
unrelated watermarks in CIFAR-10 are also classified randomly even
in vanilla models, and we argue that relying on such a high degree
of uncertainty of a watermark is quite risky, and we go into more
detail about these risks in the following section.
General Laundering Observations. To conclude this rather
extensive evaluation, we make general observations regarding the
rounds and percentages used for laundering:
(1) The larger the laundering dataset size, the more rounds
of laundering are possible without subsequent decrease in
accuracy.
(2) The more complex the model, the more likely subsequent
rounds of laundering will significantly harm the final test
accuracy.
(3) In most cases, once the watermark has been removed, it
is unlikely to return unless it was embedded with a high
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Figure 5: Demonstrations of how legitimately trained models
can fluctuate on classifying a watermarked image as the back-
doored class during training.
randomly-occurring threshold (as in CIFAR-10 unrelated
watermarks).
As a result, we make a general recommendation rule that laundering
more than 3 rounds will result in diminishing returns for adver-
saries where they will be losing final test accuracy without removing
additional watermark accuracy.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss several key issues related to choosing wa-
termark detection thresholds; the integrity, reliability, and accuracy
of recovered watermarks; and adversarial watermarks.
7.1 On choosing the minimum watermark
detection threshold
Figure 5 (a) represents our MNIST model training on clean data and
attempting to classify unrelated watermarks. As shown in Figure 5,
there is no true final value at which a converged, clean model will
classify “unrelated” watermark images. It is entirely possible that
a legitimate network could stop being trained during the epoch
where the watermark classification accuracy is quite high, purely by
coincidence. For the unrelated watermarks and especially for the
CIFAR-10 model in Figure 5 (b), this effect is even greater, with
fluctuations reaching above 50% after certain epochs.
As a result, we argue that any laundered network that falls be-
low the highest naturally occurring watermark classification rate
is unable to provide any provable ownership for the true owner of
the network. Furthermore, even laundered models that fall closely
above this threshold may not provide any meaningful ownership
for the true owner of the network because a black-box model relies
strictly on accuracy, not loss, and a (perhaps random) fluctuation of
a couple percentages may not be enough to demonstrate ownership
of a model. Note that in Figure 5, the CIFAR-10 model does not
reach 90% because we did not perform data augmentation (rotating,
scaling, etc.) during the training of this example model.
(a) Original Image (b) Recovered Image (c) Retraining Image
Figure 6: (a) Watermark, (b) attempted reconstruction, and (c)
reconstruction applied to a clean image from Zhang et al.’s [2]
content-based watermarks.
7.2 On the reliability and integrity of DNN
watermarks
In the DeepSigns [5] research, the authors further expand upon the
requirements of effective watermarks proposed in Uchida et al.’s
original design [4]. In addition to including generalizability (that
the model should work in both white-box and black-box settings),
the authors argue that neural network watermarks should have both
1) reliability to yield minimal false negatives and 2) integrity to
yield minimal false positives. However, using our method on water-
marked neural networks significantly hinders and defeats the ability
of current watermark embedding processes to claim reliability and
integrity. Adversaries are able to significantly increase false nega-
tives and false positives in watermarked networks without access to
the original training watermarks or the original training set.
For example, the reliability and integrity of the watermarks are
in question if the detection accuracy is not significantly consistent.
We argue this is especially true in unrelated watermarks because
unrelated watermarks have no “correct” answer in these networks.
In the MNIST set, the network was trained to classify the letter “m”
as a “0”. After applying adversary laundering, the unrelated images
were still classified as “0” 16% of the time, but were classified as
“8” 45% of the time and “9” 25%. In the case of CIFAR-10, the
unrelated images of an MNIST “1” digit were embedded as the
watermarked class of “airplane” and were detected as such 23% of
the time, but were also classified as “ship” 52%, and as “truck” 21%.
Non-watermarked networks could come to similar classifications
and may not demonstrate ownership in the current methods.
Further complicating the reliability and integrity of demonstrating
ownership through watermarks is the ability for adversaries to gen-
erate adversarial images via a stolen model. Such examples allow
an adversary to conversely claim ownership retroactively through a
stolen model. We discuss this in more detail in Appendix 7.5.
7.3 On the inaccuracy of recovered watermarks
Using multiple iterations of the full laundering algorithm results in
watermark reconstruction that is far from perfect yet is sufficient in
most cases. For example, in Figure 6, even though the recovered
watermark does not resemble any human-interpretable meaning of
the original watermark, it is sufficient to remove the watermark
during the laundering process. We speculate that these attacks work
on watermarks because of the black-box nature of neural networks,
where it is very difficult to control exactly which features are learned.
Therefore, even if the reconstructions are not exact, they will be
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(a) Original Image
(classified as “frog”)
(b) Adversarial Image
(classified as “cat”)
Figure 7: Adversarial example constructed against the stolen
model that fools both the original model and the laundered
model into classifying the image as “cat”.
similar enough to the learned features to 1) identify potentially-
watermarked neurons, and 2) overwrite them during retraining.
As a result of this phenomenon, we argue that current water-
marking approaches, where the watermarked images are simply fed
into the neural network training data and trained on them indis-
criminately are not adequately fulfilling some crucial criteria. In
addition to existing watermark criteria (fidelity, robustness, etc.),
we propose that watermarks should be embedded with specificity.
As an example, to achieve the specificity requirement, a network
being watermarked with content such as that in Figure 6 (a) would
not lose its watermarked quality even if (b) is recovered and the
network is retrained on (c). Although the content of (b) contains
some very generalized features of the watermark in (a), we posit
that this should not be sufficient to violate such a specificity require-
ment, where a watermark should only be removed or overwritten by
retraining, when the retraining images contain substantially similar
watermarked examples.
7.4 On the drop in test accuracy of laundered
models
In proposed watermarking strategies [2], the proponents could argue
that the drop in test accuracy from watermark removal techniques are
sufficient to prevent attackers from stealing or using stolen models.
In our examples, our method generally performs well regarding the
ability to maintain test accuracy, with the largest drop occurring in
CIFAR-10 against the Zhang et al. [2] “unrelated” watermark type
of approximately 9%. However, we argue that such a reduction (or
larger) in accuracy does not imply that a laundered model is not
useful. Indeed, while it is fair to point out that laundered accuracies
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 do not reach either the original model
accuracies nor the state-of-the-art, in many of our scenarios, an
attacker would not be able to approach such accuracies with their
limited datasets. We emphasize that a laundered model is useless
only if the laundered model performs worse than a model trained
from scratch on the same (limited) dataset.
In situations, where adversaries have very limited datasets (e.g.,
0.6% of the original training size), adversaries can use a stolen
laundered model to improve their classification accuracy. In such
cases, where training data may be very difficult to obtain or is very
expensive (such as medical data, high-quality clean data, etc.), a
stolen model, even if watermarked, remains enticing to an adversary
not only to steal for private use but also perhaps to launder and
deploy.
Additionally, we also demonstrate that the reported results of
black-box backdoor watermark attacks are overestimating the ability
of model to retain those watermarks. Related work is not adequately
exploring the potential for attackers to detect and remove neurons
and/or weights that are contributing to the detection of watermarks.
7.5 On the issue of adversarial watermarks
Another point to consider is that a stolen model is susceptible to
a wide range of adversarial attacks. Notwithstanding other secu-
rity threats posed by adversarial examples in such a scenario, given
white-box access to a model, an adversary could easily manufac-
ture images that they claim to be watermarked but are actually
adversarially-crafted against the original network. In this case, it
will be additionally difficult to prove ownership of the model.
For example, Figure 7 contains an adversarial image constructed
against a stolen Zhang et al. [2] CIFAR-10 content watermarked net-
work. The original model classifies the adversarial image of “frog”
as “cat”. Due to the similarity between the two networks and the
ability for adversarial examples to transfer between models [20], it
is also mis-classifed as “cat” in the post-laundering model as well
without targeting that model specifically. This particular laundered
model performs with 85% accuracy on the original task, but with
1.5% accuracy on the original watermarks. However, when construct-
ing adversarial images, the adversary can choose any percentage
of final watermark detection accuracy by also purposefully crafting
adversarial watermarks that fail to be detected.
Moreover, even without actually embedding their own “evil” wa-
termark into this model, an adversary can simply create an adversar-
ial example that looks sufficiently similar to a watermark of which
the adversarial claims ownership. One may argue that adversarial
examples of this sort may be easy to detect because the text (“evil”,
in this case) contains some human-noticeable noise, yet an optimiza-
tion algorithm that forbid noise in those pixel locations would likely
find a suitable minimum without significantly more work. We leave
such an implementation to future work.
7.6 Limitations of prior watermark removal
techniques
Considering the similarities between watermarks and backdoors, it
is natural to question why the original Neural Cleanse approach [9]
is not sufficient for some backdoor removal attempts. We argue
that this arises due to two differences in our approaches. First, our
method does not inherently rely on the outlier detection mechanism
to be accurate; an adversary assumes there to be a watermark regard-
less of its outcome. This is especially necessary for backdoors as
opposed to watermarks due to 1) the limitation of the datasets avail-
able, and 2) the types of augmentations that are used as watermarks.
Indeed, in the content-based watermark reconstruction, we do find
that the results are as expected from the original approach; how-
ever, for the noise and unrelated reconstructions shown in Figure 8,
an outlier detection scheme may struggle to decide which label is
watermarked.
10
(a) Noise Recon Label 0 (b) Noise Recon Label 3
(d) Unrelated Recon Label 0 (e) Unrelated Recon Label 3
Figure 8: CIFAR-10 reconstructed watermarks using the Neu-
ral Cleanse [9] algorithm. Outlier detection struggles to detect
the watermarked class; actual watermarked class is Label 0.
Second, as described earlier, the unrelated watermark has no
ground-truth class, and the original Neural Cleanse approach [9]
and even Fine-Pruning [8] do not consider this situation. Either of
these two methods leave the unrelated watermark largely untouched.
On the other hand, we retrain on all images applied with the recon-
structed mask labeled as the correct class as well as on all masks
themselves labeled as the least-likely class.
8 RELATED WORK
Despite the application of neural networks across a wide variety
of domains, research into digital rights management or intellectual
property protection schemes for them remains limited. Some re-
search has investigated the feasibility of incorporating encryption
schemes into neural networks, and one such example is the work
by Hesamifard et al. [21] who developed CryptoDL to preserve the
privacy of raw images being trained in CNNs. Using a modification
of such schemes encryption schemes, it may be possible to train
a network that can only make predictions on new data when the
input has been encrypted with the same training private key, thus
preserving the intellectual property rights of the neural network’s
owner in the case of theft.
Originally, Uchida et al. [4] proposed embedding watermarks into
the convolutional layer(s) of a deep neural network using a parameter
regularizer. However, their procedure required white-box access to
the weights of the neural network, which is not feasible or practical
in many theft scenarios. Therefore, black-box watermarking models
have been proposed as well. One proposed model takes advantage of
adversarial examples to detect watermarks [22], but this method may
be vulnerable to retraining techniques aimed to reduce the impact of
adversarial examples. “DeepSigns” [5] demonstrated the potential
to detect watermarks through the probability density function of
the outputs of a neural network in both white-box and black-box
scenarios.
Other approaches have similarly attempted to embed watermarks
that are more resilient to vanilla fine-tuning and fine-pruning tech-
niques. One such work proposed exponential weighting [23] whereby
the weights of the neural network are significantly diminished if they
are small, leaving only weights that have large absolute values to
influence the operation of the model. However, this method is also
susceptible to our algorithm because such highly absolute activation
values appear especially in the presence of watermarked images
but not in non-watermarked images. This correlates to line 10 in
Algorithm 1. Nevertheless, more advanced backdoor embedding
proposals have been proposed as well. Specifically, Li et al. [24]
propose embedding a watermark via an encoder such that the final
watermarked image is barely distinguishable from the original image.
Future work will investigate the robustness of such schemes.
Furthermore, there are two additional recent work that explore
the ability to mitigate the robustness of watermarks that take ad-
vantage of backdoors of neural networks. Hitaj and Mancini [25]
propose using an ensemble of networks to reduce the likelihood of a
watermark being correctly classified as well as a detector network
that attempts to return random classes if it believes a watermark is
present in the image. Shafieinejad et al. [26] also investigate content,
noise, and abstract categories of watermarks, but instead of attempt-
ing to recover the watermark then remove it, the authors propose
copying the functionality of the model directly through queries via a
non-watermarked dataset.
Finally, while we focus primarily on the intersection of neural
network backdoors and neural network watermarking, other research
has investigated the relationship of watermarking a digital media
with adversarial machine learning. Quiring et al. [27] demonstrate
that watermarking and adversarial machine learning attacks correlate
such that increasing the robustness of a classifier can be used to
prevent oracle attacks against watermarked image detection.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a novel “laundering” algorithm that focuses on low-
level manipulation of a neural network based on the relative activa-
tion of neurons to remove the detection of watermarks via black-box
methods. We demonstrated significant weaknesses in current wa-
termarking techniques, especially when compared to the results
reported in the original research [2, 3]. Specifically, we were able
to remove watermarks below ownership-proving thresholds, while
achieving test accuracies above 97% and 80% for both MNIST
and CIFAR-10, respectively, for all evaluated model and watermark
combinations using a highly restricted dataset (0.6% of the original
training size in most cases).
In addition, we provided new insight in marrying the fields of
watermark embedding and removal with backdoor embedding and
removal. As we have shown in this research, these two will have
opposite repercussions on each other: increasing defense against
backdoors will reduce the effectiveness of watermarks. From this
work, we hope that future work will continue to challenge and
improve existing neural network watermarking strategies as well as
explore additional avenues for detecting and removing backdoors in
neural networks.
Future work will investigate the feasibility of further decreasing
black-box watermark effectiveness in two ways. First, future work
will consider the possibility of boosting a collection of laundered
neural networks using the black-box adversary method. It may
be possible to boost the overall accuracy by combining multiple
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heavily laundered (10+ rounds) models and tallying all their votes
for one classification using a method such as AdaBoost [28]. Second,
future work will consider the ability of an adversary to attempt to
prevent queries to a laundered network when the victim attempts to
feed unrelated images for classification. Existing work has already
considered detecting out-of-distribution examples [29], and even a
poor classifier of this type could further weaken the effectiveness of
unrelated watermarks below the acceptable threshold.
To conclude, our results indicate that current work proposing to
use backdoors for watermarks in neural networks are overestimating
the robustness of these watermarks while underestimating the ability
of attackers to retain high test accuracy. For the content-based and
noise-based watermarks, the watermarks are not robust to detec-
tion, reconstruction, and removal attacks. All methods do present
some additional overhead to model thieves, both in computational
resources as well as in the final classification accuracy, particularly
in the unrelated style; however, hopefully our work demonstrates
that their adoption should not be considered as secure against per-
sistent removal attempts as more complex backdoor reconstruction
methods are developed.
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A APPLICATION ON BACKDOOR ATTACKS
Throughout this work, the focus has been primarily on watermarks
embedded into neural networks. However, as stated previously, most
watermarking techniques can be considered a subset of backdooring
attacks. As a result, we will focus on some of the implications of our
proposed techniques specifically on backdoor attacks throughout the
following sections.
Neural Network Backdooring Background. Inserting back-
doors into neural networks is a common threat against deep learning
systems, and it typically occurs before initial training by data set
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Table 3: Results of the black-box adversary algorithm against YT-Faces backdoor
Method Dataset Watermark
Type
Original Test
Accuracy
Laundered
Test
Accuracy
Original
Watermark
Accuracy
Laundered
Watermark
Accuracy
Vanilla Model
Watermark
Accuracy
Limited
Retraining
Size
Fine-Pruning
YT-Faces Content
97.4% 97.7% 99.8% 0.00% 0.00% 10%
Ours 99.04% 97.00% 100% 0.00% 0.00% 0.6%
(a) Original label of “9” (b) Backdoor label of “0”
(c) W. Macy (d) W. Macy as AJ Cook
Figure 9: Additional examples of backdoors adopted in fine-
tuning [8] that we attempt to remove as well using laundering.
poisoning. Sometimes referred to as a “trojaned” model [7], de-
ploying a network embedded with a backdoor provides an attacker
with a means to easily and predictably control the output of a neural
network. As long as the backdoor does not significantly affect the
performance on the validation set, detecting the presence of these
attacks can be very challenging due to the inherent black-box nature
of neural networks. Backdoors have been demonstrated across a
wide variety of tasks and network architectures [6, 7, 10].
One such approach to removing backdoors in deep neural net-
works is the work by Liu et al. [8]. The authors propose a two-step
process to remove backdoors by first pruning the network followed
by fine-tuning the pruned network. Their method shows success
in removing backdoors from different deep neural network imple-
mentations. Two such examples are 1) speech recognition using the
AlexNet model [30] backdoored by Liu et al.’s content overlay [7]
and 2) face identification using DeepID by Sun et al. [31] back-
doored by Chen el al.’s sunglasses content overlay [10]. For these
two networks, their results revealed that their method reduces the
attack accuracy to 13% in the speech recognition task and to 0% in
the face identification task.
Because Liu et al.’s fine-pruning [8] does not target watermarks
specifically, in order to demonstrate the transferability of removing
backdoors to removing watermarks in general, we also implement
these network architectures and backdoor them. For evaluation, we
consider the basic backdoor poisoning to be a watermark embedded
into the network, and we apply our watermark-removal techniques
on them (using a limited amount of retraining data). Examples of
the backdoors are shown in Figure 9. Image (a) represents a clean
example of an utterance of class “9”, and (b) represents a content-
based backdoor for a speech-recognition test. Similarly, (c) is a clean
example of William Macy from the YouTube Faces [32] dataset, and
(d) represents a content-based backdoor for a facial recognition test,
where all sunglasses images are to be labeled incorrectly as A. J.
Cook.
YT-Faces Results via Chen et al.’s Backdoor Method. While
the technique from Chen et al.’s method [10] is proposed as a back-
dooring technique, we investigate the effectiveness of our approach
as a way to remove the backdoor and compare our results to the
results of fine-pruning [8]. We implement the same backdoor trigger
and neural network structure as utilized in the “Fine-Pruning” pa-
per [8], and we are successfully able to match their findings on the
YT-Faces dataset, and as with the other examples, we use a signifi-
cantly smaller dataset in our model. A summary of these results is
presented in Table 3.
Detailed Removal Results. The dataset used for the voice recog-
nition set is taken from the Pannous Caffe speech recognition reposi-
tory 3, which consists of 300 spectrogram examples of utterances of
each digit 0 through 9. The backdoor embedding process labels a
watermarked image as (actual label + 1) modulo 10 as performed in
related work [8]. We find that the AlexNet model [30] is much more
complex than necessary for this task, and the network easily embeds
the backdoors/watermarks. Nevertheless, our method still allows for
the network to remove the watermarks while retaining high accuracy
on the testing set.
For example, we launder the network using our proposed method
and find that adversaries can retrain the network to above 99% ac-
curacy while watermark/backdoor success rate converges at nearly
4.5%. Our laundered network continually predicted “9” for any im-
age it did not properly recognize, and when taking this into account
less than 1% of images were substantially classified into the back-
doored category. A graphical overview is again shown in Figure 12,
where boxes in red are cases where backdoored images were success-
ful. For comparison via Liu et al.’s method, backdoored examples
were misclassified 13% of the time.
This speech-classification case is particularly interesting because
of the weakness of the backdoor attack. In fact, we find that instead
of labeling each image type separately (“1” as “2”, “2” as “3”, etc.),
labeling all watermarked images as one case provides a substantially
more robust backdoor. After laundering the network but shortly
into retraining, we found that the model was performing at 20% test
accuracy but 100% watermark accuracy, with each guess being class
“0”, which was coincidentally the watermarked class answer.
3https://github.com/pannous/caffe-speech-recognition
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Figure 10: Example in the speech recognition task of worst-case
scenario for adversary where the laundered model consistently
guesses the backdoored class. However, significant retraining
eventually removes this phenomenon.
As shown in Figure 10, the watermark detection rate continues to
drop from 100% down to virtually 0% while retraining the laundered
model. Despite some fluctuations early on, this backdoor watermark-
ing technique is removed almost entirely after significant retraining.
Note that 10% of all the watermarked examples truly were the “0”
class when testing the watermark accuracy. Therefore, even at the
high detection rates throughout retraining, when subtracting 10% of
detection, it only infrequently reaches above 10%.
Confusion Matrix Comparison. As shown in Figure 11, a non-
backdoored neural network only classifies a negligible 2.2% of all
examples are placed into the backdoored class. In Figure 11, these
classifications occur in the red boxes, which only amount to 11 mis-
classifications in total. Comparatively, the laundered version of a
previously backdoored network performs with 4.5% backdoor (or
watermark) classification accuracy amounting to only 22 watermark
misclassifications in total, shown in Figure 12. As of now, water-
marking standards may not consistently rely on such a small absolute
difference with current methods. Even as targeted backdoor attacks,
the effectiveness is limited after applying our removal techniques.
B ADDITIONAL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES
For reference, we have outlined the structures of the neural networks
described earlier in the paper in the following Table 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.
All networks utilized in this work are contained below with the
exception of the ResNet architecture leveraged for implementing
Adi et al.’s watermarking scheme [3]. For such information, we
followed the open-source version here 4, where n = 3.
4https://github.com/keras-team/keras/blob/master/examples/cifar10 resnet.py
Figure 11: Confusion matrix of a non-watermarked neural net-
work of the Pannous speech-recognition task in the presence of
watermarked images.
Figure 12: Confusion matrix for the classification of backdoor
(watermarked) images in the speech recognition task. The net-
work consistently guesses “9” for watermarked images regard-
less of their actual backdoored class.
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Table 4: Architecture of the adaptation of the DeepID [31] used in the YT-Faces task; the middle layers do not have activation
functions.
Layer Activation Filters Layer Filters
Conv2D ReLU 32×(11×11) Dense 160 units ↘
Max Pooling / 2×2 ↗ Layer Activation Filters
Conv2D ReLU 32×(7×7) Dense ReLU 160 units
Max Pooling / 2×2 ↘ Dense Softmax 1037 units
Conv2D ReLU 32×(5×5) Conv2D 32×(5×5) ↗
Max Pooling / 2×2 Dense 160 units
Table 5: Black-box adversary MNIST Zhang et al. [2] water-
marked networks; where applicable padding is valid
Layer Type Activation Kernel Strides
Conv2D ReLU 32×(5×5) 1×1
MaxPool2D / 2×2 2×2
Conv2D ReLU 16×(5×5) 1×1
MaxPool2D / 2×2 2×2
Dense ReLU 512 units /
Dense Softmax 10 units /
Table 6: Black-box adversary MNIST+ Zhang et al. [2] water-
marked networks; where applicable padding is valid
Layer Type Activation Kernel Strides
Conv2D ReLU 32×(3×3) 1×1
Conv2D ReLU 32×(3×3) 1×1
MaxPool2D / 2×2 2×2
Conv2D ReLU 64×(3×3) 1×1
Conv2D ReLU 64×(3×3) 1×1
MaxPool2D / 2×2 2×2
Dense ReLU (dropout=0.5) 200 units /
Dense ReLU (dropout=0.5) 200 units /
Dense Softmax 16 units /
Table 7: Black-box adversary CIFAR-10 Zhang et al. [2] wa-
termarked networks; where applicable padding is same, kernel
weight regularizer contains weight decay of 0.0001
Layer Type Activation Kernel Strides
Conv2D ReLU (BatchNorm) 32×(3×3) 1×1
Conv2D ReLU (BatchNorm) 32×(3×3) 1×1
MaxPool2D (dropout=0.2) 2×2 2×2
Conv2D ReLU (BatchNorm) 64×(3×3) 1×1
Conv2D ReLU (BatchNorm) 64×(3×3) 1×1
MaxPool2D (dropout=0.3) 2×2 2×2
Conv2D ReLU (BatchNorm) 128×(3×3) 1×1
Conv2D ReLU (BatchNorm) 128×(3×3) 1×1
MaxPool2D (dropout=0.4) 2×2 2×2
Dense Softmax 10 units /
Table 8: Architecture of the adaptation of the AlexNet [30]
model used for the Pannous speech recognition task
Layer Type Activation Padding Filters
Conv2D / valid 32×(3×3)
Max Pooling / / 2×2
Conv2D / same 32×(3×3)
Max Pooling / / 2×2
Conv2D ReLU same 64×(3×3)
Conv2D ReLU same 64×(3×3)
Conv2D ReLU same 64×(3×3)
Dense ReLU / 200 units
Dense ReLU / 200 units
Dense Softmax / 10 units
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